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PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL NAME ACT 
A model name act would provide solutions for many problems 
involving personal names ,1 such as questions of identity, by build-
ing on the framework of the common law. An act would provide a 
basis for future legal developments in the law of names to promote 
the individual's interest in freedom of self-expression and the 
state's interest in consistent application and record keeping. Legis-
lation creates certainty avoiding burdensome and expensive litiga-
tion by providing judges with a clear and stable reference and 
reducing the number of situations requiring judicial decisions. 
This note will discuss the common law of names relating to such 
issues as identity, contract, civil procedure, and criminal proce-
dure, as well as discussing common law and statutory change of 
name methods. The failure of some courts to apply the existing law 
of names in a manner consistent with the state interest in record 
keeping and the personal interest in freedom of expression will be 
reviewed. Finally, a model act will be proposed attempting to 
reconcile and promote these interests. 
I. THE EXISTING LAW OF NAMES 
A. The Common Law 
A name is "a word or phrase by which a person, ... is known, 
called, or spoken to or of; ... a word or words expressing some 
quality considered to be characteristic or descriptive of a person 
... fame, reputation, or character. ... " 2 Since at least the early 
nineteenth century, a person's name has generally been held to 
consist of at least two distinct names, a given name and a sur-
name.3 A person may acquire a name at birth, 4 through statutory 
'This note is concerned only with the law respecting the names of natural persons. 
2WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1193 (unabridged 2d. ed. 1975). 
3See, e.g., Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 213 F. Supp. 174, 176 (E.D. S.C. 
1963); Calhoun v. F.G. Elliott Hardware Co., 34 Del. 552, 156 A. 343 (Super. Ct. 1931); 
Burton v. State, 75 Ind. 477,478 (1881); but see. Brashear v. Stothard, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 265, 
265-66 (I 8 I 5), where the court stated: 
The plaintiffs sue by the names of Stothard and Starky, and whether both or either 
of them have any other name, is not a matter of law, but a matter of fact, for we 
know of no law, which requires a person to have two names, and if he has but one 
he may certainly sue by that. 
European countries under the civil law have paralleled many aspects of the common law, 
including the requirement that a person have at least two names. W. Schatzel, Le nom des 
perso1111es. 95 RECUEIL DES COURS III 183, 201 (1958). 
•see. e.g .. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 34 (1958). 
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proceedings,5 or by repute, that is, throu.gh the use of a name.6 
There have been two general approaches to the legal function of 
a personal name. Courts in some jurisdictions have regarded names 
as the equivalent of the person named. · 
[l]t is well settled that identity of name imports, prima facie, 
identity of person .... It would seem to follow that a difference 
of name imports, prima.facie, a difference of person. A change 
of name, then, it can be argued, always imports, at least prima 
facie, a difference in identity. To some extent, a change of name 
always conceals the nominee's identity. 7 
"ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 278 (1959); ALASKA STAT.§ 09.55.010 (Supp. 1976) (granted on the 
showing of sufficient reason such as marriage or divorce and consistent with the public 
interest); ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 12-601-602 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-801-803 (1962) 
(upon good reasons shown); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CooE §§ 1275-1279.5 (West 1972 & Supp. 
1976); CoLO. REv. STAT.§§ 13-15-101 to 102 (1974) (allowed if proper and not detrimental to 
the interests of another person); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-11 (I 960); DEL CoDE. ANN. tit. IO, 
§§ 5901-5905 (1975 & Supp. 1976); D.C. CODE§§ 16-2501 to 2503 (1973) (upon a showing that 
the court deems satisfactory); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 62.031 (1969 & Supp. 1975) (relevant 
informational requirements in statute); GA. CooE §§ 79-501 to 504 (1975); HAW. REv. STAT. 
§ 574-5 (1969) (only by order of the Lieutenant Governor); IDAHO CooE §§ 7-801 to 804 (1949 
& Supp. 1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 96, §§ 1-3 (Smith-Hurd 1974 & Supp. 1976); IND. CODE. 
ANN.§§ 34-4-6-1 to 5 (Burns 1972); IOWA CODE§§ 674.1 to 14 (1971); KAN. STAT.§§ 60-1401 
to 1402 (1964); KY. REv. STAT.§§ 401.010 to .040 (1972 & Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN.§§ 13:4751-4755 (West 1968 & Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 781 (Supp. 1976); 
Mo. ANN. CooE arJ. 16, § 123 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 12 (Michie/Law Co-op 
1969) (for sufficient" reasons consistent with the public interest); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 711.1 to .2 (Supp. 1976) (court permitting anyone with same or similar name to intervene 
to show fraudulent or evil intent); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 259.10 to .I I (West Supp. 1976) 
· (court granting change unless fraud or evil intent or if a child change not in the best interests 
of the child); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 93-17-1 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT.§§ 572.270 to .290 (1969) 
(mandatory to grant change of name if proper and not detrimental to the interests of any 
other person); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-100-1 to 5, §§ 93-100-7 to 9 (1964 & Supp. 
1975); NEB. REV. STAT.§§ 61-101 to 102 (1971); NEV. REv. STAT.§§ 41.270 to .290 (1975); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 547:7 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2A:52-I to 4 (West 1952 & Supp. 
1976); N.M. STAT.§§ 22-5-1 to 3 (1954); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW§§ 60-64 (McKinney 1976); 
N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ IOI-I to 7 (1972) (may only change name once); N.D. CENT. CoDE §§ 
32-28-01, -04 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2717.01 (Page Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1631-1640 (West 1961); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 33.410 to .430 (1975); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 54, §§ 1-6 (Purdon 1964); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24, § 1231 (Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS§ 8-9-9 (1970); S.C. CODE§§ 48-51 to 55"(1962 & Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS 
ANN.§§ 21-37-1 to 5, -IO (1969); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 23.801 to 805 (1955 & Supp. 1976); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§§ 32.01 to .05 & 32.21 to .24 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 42-1-1- to 
3 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 811-816 (1974) (with the change ofa husband's name the 
name of the rest of the family changes but consent needed of children over 14); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 559 (1974) (change of child's name pursuant to a divorce); V.1. CoDE ANN. 
tit. 16, §§ 181-182 ( 1964) (for sufficient reasons not inconsistent with the public interest); VA. 
CooE § 8-577.1 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CooE § 4.24. 130 (1974); W. VA. CooE §§ 48-5-1 
to 6 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN.§§ 296.36 to .37 (West Supp. 1976) (professionals restricted in 
their access to- a change of name); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-739 to 742 (1959). 
See Statutory Development, Pre-Marriage Name Change, Resumption and Registration 
Sta/lites, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 1508 (1974). 
6 ln In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402,404 (Mo. App. 1975), the court stated, "[T]he courts 
have indicated that a person's name is the designation given to the individual by himself or 
herself and others .... "; see Wilson v. State, 69 Ga. 224, 235 (1882); Commonwealth v. 
Trainor, 123 Mass. 414, 415 (1877); Mississippi State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Mandell, 
198 Miss. 49, 21 So. 2d 405 (1945); State ex rel. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. Cowan, 
356 Mo. 674, 203 S.W.2d 407 (1947). 
7Esco v. State, 278 Ala. 641, 643. 179 So.2d 766, 768 (1965); Accord, Kirk v. Bonner, 186 
Ark. 1063, 57 S.W.2d 802 (1933); Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97 (1853); Mitchell v. State, 134 
FALL 1976] Proposal for a Model Name Act 155 
Courts which follow this approach hold that names must be exact 
to have legal weight. Neither description nor abbreviation can be 
the equivalent of a name. 8 
Other courts have held that the purpose of a name is to denomi-
nate the particular individual. As long as the person's identity is 
adequately certain, a variation in name is unimportant. "Jurisdic-
tion attaches to persons, to things, to facts, not to mere words, and 
an error in name is nothing where there is certainty as to the thing 
•••• "
9 Although these two approaches to names need not be 
mutually exclusive, the latter view, which was more prevalent in 
the early nineteenth century, is generally being replaced by the 
former. 
Names have social as well as legal significance as identifiers. It is 
certainly not accidental that the word "name" is a synonym for 
reputation. 10 Loss of the use of a name by which one is commonly 
known can mean a virtual loss of a person's position in a commu-
nity. In several cases involving elections, a candidate's opponent 
has charged that the name under which the candidate was to appear 
on the ballot was not the person's real name. 11 In these cases, the 
courts have recognized that to force the candidate to appear under 
an unfamiliar name would assure a defeat. With the purpose of a 
name being to denominate a particular individual, the courts con-
Ga. App. 376,214 S.E.2d 593 (1975); Jones v. Kohler, 137 Ind. 528, 37 N.E. 399 (1894); 
Riley v. Litchfield, 168 Iowa 187, 150 N.W. 81 (1914); O'Brien v. Board of Election 
Comm'rs, 257 Mass. 332, 153 N.E. 553 (1926); Young v. Jewell, 201 Mass. 385, 87 N.E .. 604 
(1909); State v. Deppe, 286 S. W.2d 776, 781 (Mo. 1956); N.Y. Arr'v GEN. OP. No . .24 at 239 
(1931). One author has stated incorrectly that a person can have only one name. Note, A 
Woman's Right to Her Name, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 665,672 (1973). Some early courts have 
held that in order to have more than one name it was necessary to be known equally well by 
the other name or names. See, e.g., Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97, 137 (1853). Later courts 
have held that the person must be known by each name, but not necessarily equally well by 
each. See, e.g., State v. Dresser, 54 Me. 569 (1866); Young v. Jewell, 201 Mass. 385, 87 
N.E. 604 (1909). 
8Putnam v. Bessom, 291 Mass. 217, 197 N.E. 147 (1935); cf., Nelson, The Reform of 
Common Law Pleading in Massachusetts 1760-/830: Adjudication as a Prelude to Legisla-
tion, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 106-07 (1973). Nelson found that in the late eighteenth century 
courts required that a person's exact name be given or a pleading would be held inadequate. 
Later courts allowed inaccuracy as long as the person was adequately identified. In the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, there was a return to the more exacting requirements. See 
notes 7 & 9 and accompanying text. 
9Milbra v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 182 Ala. 622, 630, 62 So. 176, 179 (1913); 
accord, National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Saffold, 225 Ala. 664, 144 So. 816 (1932); 
Washington v. State, 68 Ala. 85 (1880); Terry v. Klein, 133 Ark. 366,201 S.W. 801 (1918); 
Bogart v. Woodruff, 96 Cal. 609, 31 P. 618 (1892); In re Westerman, 401 111. 489, 82 N.E.2d 
474 (1948); Feld v. Loftis, 240 111. 105, 88 N.E. 281 (1909); Parmelee v. Raymond, 43 111. 
App. 609 (1892); cf. Nelson, supra note 8 at 113-14 (discussing the use of names as identity 
referents in pleadings in the early nineteenth century). 
10Amold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227,232 (1906), states, "[T]here can be no more 
valuable patrimony than a good name; it is, though outside the pale of commerce, one of the 
most prized attributes of man." 
"See, e.g., Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 245 La. 145, 157·So. 
2d 718 (1963); Huff v. State Election Bd., 168 Okla. 277, _32 P.2d 920 (1934). 
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eluded that an unfamiliar name could not perform this function as 
well as the name by which the candidate was generally known, 
even though the name sought to be used on the ballot was not the 
candidate's given name or the one which courts would generaBy 
recognize as the person's legal name .12 Names also indicate a 
person's position in society by connecting him with a particular 
family 13 or with an ethnic group. 14 Moreover, many individuals, 
especially new parents, view names as a means of self-
expression.15 
Because the common law has defined a name as an identifier of a 
person, 16 a name can be acquired through sufficient use and repute 
to adequately denote a particular individual. 17 The doctrine of idem 
sonans is a natural outgrowth of this attitude. Under this doctrine, 
courts have held that a difference in spelling is unimportant if the 
two names sound the same or naturally suggest each other. 18 
12See, e.g., Wilty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 245 La. 145, 157 So. 
2d 718 (1963); Huff v. State Election Bd., 168 Okla. 277, 32 P.2d 920 (1934). 
'
3See, e.g., In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Ansley v. Green, 82 Ga. 181, 
7 S.E. 921 (1888); Dunn v. Palermo, __ Tenn.--, __ , 522 S.W.2d 679,681 (1975). 
14/n re Cohen, 4 Conn. Supp. 342 (1936); In re Filoramo, 40 Misc. 2d 598,243 N.Y.S.2d 
339 (Civ. Ct. 1963); In re Johns, 29 Misc. 2d 3 I, 212 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Queens County Ct. 1961). 
"This desire, however, is not limited merely to new parents. See, e.g., Stuart v. Board of 
Elections, 266 Md. 440, 442, 295 A.2d 223, 224 (1972) (discussed at notes 51-52 and 
accompanying text infra); In re John's, 29 Misc. 2d 31,212 N.Y.S.2d 146 (Queens County 
Ct. 1961); U. STANNARD, MARRIED WOMEN V. HUSBANDS' NAMES: THE CASE FOR WIVES 
WHO KEEP THEIR OWN NAME 1-2 (1973). 
However, the state has often limited this freedom, for example, in cases where the judge 
regards the change as ridiculous. Recently, Ellen Donna Cooperman petitioned to change 
her name to Cooperperson in order to express her sense of human equality. The judge 
ridiculed Ms. Cooperman by reciting a number of possible name changes which he regarded 
as silly: Jackson to Jackchild, Manning to Peopling, Carmen to Carperson. N. Y. Times, Oct. 
19, 1976, at 37, col. 4 (city ed.). 
The Civil Law countries tend to be even more restrictive in regard to permissible names. 
[In Argentina by] Executive Decree no. 11,609 of October 13, 1943, confirmed by 
Law 13,030 of October 7, 1947, registrants of civil status were prohibited from 
inscribing births of persons with first names not expressed in Spanish or not 
appearing in the calendar or among the names of the fathers of the Independence; 
consequently only names would be admitted to registry that were either Spanish or 
had become hispanicized by usage or native Indian names that had been incorpo-
rated in the national idiom (art. I, 2). Names signifying ideological or political 
tendencies, ridiculous or extravagant names or those contrary to good morals were 
to be refused registry (art 4), as well as those not corresponding to the sex of the 
person (art. 7). The use of surnames as first names was likewise prohibited (art. 5). 
Comment, The Right to Choose a Name, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 502 (1959); See also Schatzel, 
supra note 3 at 191-92. 
16See, e.g., Comer v. Jackson, 50 Ala. 384,387 (1874); State ex rel. Lane v. Comeli, 347 
Mo. 932, 940-41, 149 S.W.2d 815,821 (1941); State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 
497, 501-02, 177 N.E.2d 616,619 (1%1); Presley v. Wilson, 125 S.W.2d 654,656 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1939). 
17See, e.g., Ingram v. Watson, 211 Ala. 410, 413, 100 So. 557, 559 (1924). This is 
consistent with and an outgrowth of the concept of names as denominators. It has remained 
part of the common law even though the older concept is slowly passing out of usage; 
however, there have been steady inroads on this means of effecting a change of name as 
well. 
18See, e.g., Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Schoonhoven v. Gott, 20 Ill. 46 
(1858); Loser v. Plainfield Sav. Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 128 N.W. 1101 (1910); Brown v. 
Ch!iddick, 197 Okla. 515, 172 P.2d 996 (1946). 
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Well-accepted abbreviations such as Wm. for William, or Thos·. for 
Thomas have also been found to adequately fulfill their function of 
identification .19 
B. Legal Applications of Identity 
Three areas of the common law in which courts have frequently 
considered the issue of identity are contracts, civil procedure, and 
criminal procedure. Clearly, where a name does not make a per-
son's identification certain, it is difficult to protect his legal 
rights. 20 The individual who needs protection may be either the 
person relying on the name to single out a particular person or the 
person who has been misidentified. 
1. Contracts--Courts have enforced contracts executed by the 
use of a name other than that given at birth if the person was 
adequately identified by the name employed. Judges have found 
identification to be adequate for varying reasons. Some courts 
have held that use makes the identity certain, while maintaining 
that the birth name remains the legal name. 21 Other courts have 
stated that use effects a common law name change, so that the new 
name does become the legal name22 and is thus the appropriate 
name to use when contracting. 23 Still other courts have enforced 
these contracts on the basis of an estoppel theory. 24 Here, the 
courts inquire first into the adequacy of the identification. Where 
identification is adequate, the inquiry is limited to whether the 
1•Owens v. State, 72 Ga. App. I I, 32 S.E.2d 848 (1945); Clinton v. Miller, 124 Mont. 463, 
226 P.2d 487 (1951). 
20Reliance on names as the means of identifying people is so basic that it is difficult to 
imagine any society functioning without them. 
Legal rights do not exist in the abstract, but have meaning only as they attach to the 
individual, whether singly, as one of a specific group, or as one of the public. No 
individual has any right until he is identified. The rights to participate in govern-
ment, such as the right to vote or to hold office, have meaning only as they relate to 
identifiable human beings. 
Rider, Legal Protection of Manifestations of Individual Personality-The ldentity-lndicia, 
33 S. Cal. L. Rev. 31, 31-32 (1959). 
21 National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Saffold, 225 Ala. 664, 144 So. 816 (1932); Comer v. 
Jackson, 50 Ala. 384, 387 (1874); Vanek v. Foster, 74 Idaho 532, 263 P.2d 997 (1953); Sims v. 
Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 223 Mo. App. I 150, 23 S.W.2d 1075 (1930); Millerv. Thomason 
Supply Co., 107 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). 
22See notes 42-59 and accompanying text infra .. 
23See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 21 Ariz. App. 99,515 P.2d I 197 (1973); Graham v. Eiszner, 28 
Ill. App. 269, 273 (1888); Schofield v. Jennings, 68 Ind. 232, 235 (1879). 
24See, e.g., Tuggle v. Bank of Cave Spring, 8Ga. App. 291, 68 S.E. 1070 (1910); State ex 
rel. Schoenbacher v. Kelly, 408 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App. 1966); Tom v. First Nat'I Bank, 104· 
S.W.2d 130, 135 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). The approach which a court adopts influences the 
utility of the doctrine of mistake. If the contract was made with the physical person and the 
name merely singles out that person, then there is no mistake. However, if the name is an 
important element of the contract, then the court must assess the materiality of the name to 
the performance of the contract and determine whether the innocent party_ suffered any loss. 
See generally, A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 601-603 (1960). 
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signature was obtained by fraud or whether the signatory used the 
name with a fraudulent purpose. 25 
2. Civil Procedure-In general, when issues of identity are 
raised with reference to procedural matters, the basic question 
again is whether the person has been sufficiently identified. Due 
process requires that a party receive notice of a pending suit. 26 
Minimal due process requirements are probably met even where 
the notice received does not employ the party's birth name. 27 For 
example, if a person is generally known by a name other than the 
birth name, notice is properly given in the name by which he is 
known,28 whether the name is acquired by use 29 or whether there is 
an element of estoppel.30 When service is by publication, courts 
adhere more strictly to the requirement that there be certainty in 
the identification of any individual served in this manner. 31 Due 
process requirements are satisfied where there is no question as to 
proper identity, "no enlargement of an existing suit and no intro-
duction of any new suit ... beyond the statutory period ... , " 32 
the other party is not misled, and no further suit can be brought for 
the same claim. 33 
3. Criminal Law-Issues of identity in the field of criminal law 
differ in important respects from those encountered in contracts or 
civil procedure. Certain crimes such as impersonation,34 fraud, 35 
25/n re Adoption of Long, 56 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1952); North Am. Accident Ins. Co. v. 
Canady, 196 Okla. 105, 163 P.2d 221 (1945). 
26See, e.g., Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 
(I 917). 
27See, e.g., Schmidt v. Thomas, 33 Ill. App. 109, 111-12 (1889). The court stated that such 
service would usually be good; however, no default judgment could be entered where the 
defendant did not appear even though there had been personal service. 
28See, e.g., State v. Dresser, 54 Me. 569, 571 (1866); Frye v. Hinkley, 18 Me. 320 (1841); 
Commonwealth v. Trainor, 123 Mass. 414, 415 (1877). 
29See, e.g., Claxton v. Simons, __ Ohio App. __ , 177 N.E.2d 511 (1961), rev'd on 
other grounds, 174 Ohio St. 333, 189 N.E.2d 62 (1963); Cloud v. McK'y, 216 S.W.2d 285 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948). 
30Jones v. Kohler, 137 Ind. 528, 37 N.E. 399 (1893); Clark v. Clark, 19 Kan. 522, 524-25 
(1878). In Emery v. Kipp, 154 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86, 97 P. 17, 19 (1908) the court stated: 
[Al judgment is valid when obtained against a married woman sued as a femme sole 
and in her maiden name, particularly upon any contract which she has executed in 
such name, . . . [as] a rule of general acceptance .... This is in consonance with 
the principle of common law that a man may change his name at will and sue or be 
sued in any name in which he is known and recognized. 
31See, e.g., Pooler v. Hyne, 213 F. 154 (7th Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 620 (1915); 
Doyle v. Hays Land & Inv. Co., 80 Kan. 209, 102 P. 496 (1909) (notice by publication 
adequate); cf. Morris v. Tracy, 58 Kan. 137, 48 P. 571 (1897) (service voidable if not 
absolutely void because the defendant has not used the name under which service by 
publication was attempted); Kidd v. Rasmus, 285 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) 
(defendant not a party to a tax suit because notice given in her maiden name no longer 
sufficiently identified her). 
32McGarvey v. Atlantic City & Shore R.R. Co., 123 N.J.L. 281, 283, 8 A.2d 385, 387 
(1939). 
33 8aumeister v. Markham, IOI Ky. 122, 128-29, 39 S.W. 844, 845 (1897). 
34See, e.g., United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943); State v. Kosky, 191 
Mo. 1, 90 S.W. 454 (1905). 
35,1.,ahay v. City Nat'! Bank, 15 Colo. 339, 25 P. 704 (1890); Raser v. Moomaw, 78 Wash. 
653, 139 P. 622 (1914). 
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or forgery36 may involve the use of a name to deceive. Any use of a 
name other than the one given at birth creates the possibility of 
deception. Courts have recognized this fact and regularly inquire 
into the intent of those seeking a change of name to discover 
whether there is a fraudulent purpose. 37 
In addition, criminal law must be concerned with the identifica-
tion of those who have committed crimes. Obviously, identification 
is an important prerequisite to the imposition of criminal sanctions 
on any person. Positive identification is necessary whether the 
court is trying to identify an individual as a prior offender or as the 
person charged with the crime before the court. For example, 
additional ·sanctions are often imposed on persons with prior con-
victions.38 In this regard, identity of names is prima facie evidence 
of the identity of persons. 39 Customarily, indictments must be in 
the person's birth name or at least his usual name, 40 and if no name 
is known, that fact must be alleged.41 
C. Methods for Change of Name 
1. Common Law Procedures-In general, common law name 
change is straightforward and simple. "The name by which a 
person is generally known, although not his original name, but used 
by him in all of his business affairs becomes his legal name and is 
not a fictitious name. " 42 It is through this method of use and repute 
that a woman acquires .her husband's surname upon marriage. 43 
36See United States v. Turner, 10 U.S. (7 Pet.) 427 (1833); Hall v. United States, 372 F.2d 
603 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 923 (1%7). 
37See note 46 and accompanying text infra. 
38See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1970); State v. Cook, 463 S.W.2d 863,868 (Mo. 1971). 
39See, e.g., State v. Cook, 463 S.W. 2d 863, 868 (Mo. 1971); State v. Shumate, 516 S.W.2d 
297, 300 (Mo. App. 1974). 
• 0Washington v. State, 68 Ala. 85, 87-88 (1880); People v. Reilly, 175 Ill. App. 45, 47 
(1912); see also Nelson, supra note 8, at 106. 
41 State v. Kutter, 59 Ind. 572 (1877). 
42 Mississippi State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Mandell, 198 Miss. 49, 67, 21 So. 2d 405, 
410 (1945); accord, Alabama Clay Products Co. v. Mathews, 220 Ala. 549, 126 So. 869 
(1930); Ray v. American Photo Player Co., 46 Cal. App. 311, 189 P. 130 (1920); Reinken v. 
Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 184 N.E. 639 (1933). 
431n Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 140, 226 N.W.2d 458,459 (1975), the court stated 
"[A] woman upon her marriage adopts the surname of her husband by thereafter customar-
ily using that name, but no law requires that she do so. If she continues to use her 
antenuptial surname, her name is unchanged by the fact that marriage has occurred." 
Accord, Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395, 1402 (E.D. Ark. 1975); Custer v. Bonadies, 
30Conn. Supp. 385,318 A.2d639(1974);cf. /n re Kneipp, 172 La. 411,134 So. 377(1931)(A 
woman's name always remains her maiden name because she bears her husband's name 
only by custom.); Willy v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 245 La. 145, 171, 
157 So. 2d 718, 727 (1963) (Sanders, J., concurring) (He urged the court to base its decision 
on In re Kneipp.). Contra, Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,45 
U.S.L.W. 3432 (Dec. 12, 1976); Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 221-22 (M.D. Ala. 
1971), affd without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972); In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 
1934) (The court misstated the common law in this instance, as have other courts, holding 
that the common law requires a woman to change her surname to her husband's surname 
upon marriage.); People ex rel. Rago v. Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945). 
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The common law merely requires sufficient use of a new name 44 to 
indicate that the community in general, and creditors in particular, 
have acquiesced in the use of the new name and have come to 
identify the person by that new name. 45 The common law also 
requires that the change not be made for a fraudulent purpose. 46 
Nevertheless, some courts have suggested that even where a per-
son meets these requirements, the birth name remains the person's 
real name, and the new name is in the nature of an alias. 47 
Despite this basic simplicity, confusion has complicated the 
common law of name changes. This confusion is a result of the 
conflict of several different characteristics of names: names as a 
means of self-expression, names as a type of property, and names 
as a means by which society, in general, and the state, in particu-
lar, can keep track of its individual members. Some courts have 
restricted the freedom of certain individuals to determine their own 
names. Minors, for example, have often been denied a change of 
name. 48 In some jurisdictions, the courts have ruled that a married 
woman must adopt the surname of her husband. 49 However, for 
the most part, the common law affords a simple, inexpensive 
means for a change of name. 50 
This permissive approach to changing names is a recognition of 
the fact that there is an element of self-expression in a person's 
name. In Stuart v. Board of Elections, 51 a statutory name change 
case, Mary Emily Stuart stated that she wished to retain her given 
44Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Minning, 135 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1943). 
45/n re McUlta, 189 F. 250, 251 (M.D. Pa. 1911). 
46/n re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 694 (Me. 1975); Ogle v. Circuit Court, __ S.D. -, 227 
N.W.2d 621 (1975); State v. Lutes, 38 Wash. 2d 475,230 P.2d 786 (1951). Even a bankrupt 
has been given the right to change his name by statutory means. The court held that because 
the pull)ose of the bankruptcy statute is to give the person a fresh start, a petition for a 
change of name should be granted. In re Ross; 8 Cal. 2d 608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); see Badger 
Lumber Co. v. Collinson, 97 Kan. 791, 156 P. 724 (1916); Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 16 
A.2d 642 (1941), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 695 (1941), Pierce v. Brushart, 153 Ohio St. 372, 92 
N.E.2d 4 (1950). 
47See, e.g., People v. Darcy, 159 Cal. App. 342, 139 P.2d 118 (1943); Moore v. Bank of 
Dahlonega, 82 Ga. App. 142, 60 S.E.2d 507 (1950). 
48/n re Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1968); see notes 55-56 and 
accompanying text infra. 
49See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D Ala. 1971), affd without opinion, 
405 U.S. 970 (1972); In re Kayaloff, 9 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); People ex rel. Rago v. 
Lipsky, 327 Ill. App. 63, 63 N.E.2d 642 (1945). In addition, three states have statutes which 
allow a court to forbid a woman _to use her husband's surname or his given name following a 
divorce. See, ALA. CoDE tit. 34, § 39(1) (Cum. Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-21 
(1952); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.150 (Supp. 1976). 
• 0 Bentham, What's In a Name?, 115 JusT. P. 616 (1951), states at 616: 
[I]t is perhaps characteristic of the sound and sense and elasticity of our English 
law that ... it should make no attempt in general to limit a man's right to change his 
name, by the assumption of any name he pleases, either in substitution for, or in 
addition to, his original name. The law concerns itself only with the question 
whether he has in fact assumed or come to be known by a different name .... 
51 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972). 
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name because "her marriage ... was 'based on the idea that we're 
both individuals and our names symbolize that.' " 52 One court in a 
petition for a name change using the statutory procedure recog-
nized the element of self-expression when it stated, "[t]here is no 
statutory requirement ... that the petitioner establish any particu-
lar reason other than his personal desire for a change of name.' '53 It 
is not unusual for converts to a new religion to display their new 
convictions by a change of name.54 Courts have held that a name is 
"the designation given to the individual by himself or herself 
•••• "
55 A person generally chooses a name which is personally 
pleasing or expressive of some desirable trait, avoiding names 
considered ugly, obscene, or silly. Names undergo changes in 
popularity as people search for ways to express themselves. Social 
expectations can even persuade people to alter their names to 
express change in status, as, for example, in the United States 
where many women customarily change their names upon mar-
riage. 
Although names are a well-recognized means of self-expression, 
a person has no property right in his name.56 In other words, it is 
not possible to prevent another from using one's name, absent a 
showing of fraudulent purpose or an intent to invade the rights of 
another.57 However, courts have seemed willing to recognize 
something resembling a property right in a father who wishes to 
have his children bear his name. This question usually arises after a 
divorce, when the mother with custody of the children remarries 
and thereafter petitions to have her children's names changed to 
that of the stepfather. Courts have held that fathers have a right58 
or a protectable interest59 in having their children bear their name, 
and therefore, generally deny petitions for a change of name. 
52/d. at 442, 295 A.2d at 224. 
53/n re Hauptly,_ Ind._,_, 312 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1974). 
54See. e.g .. In re Green, 54 Misc. 2d 606, 283 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Civ. Ct. 1%7). 
55See In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Mo. App. 1975). In order to implement the 
freedom which the common law gives the individual in determining his name, courts should 
exercise minimal discretion, only inquiring into the question of fraud. 
56See, Fulghum v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 463, 192 S.E.2d 376, 377 (1972); Bentham, note 50 
supra. But see P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 466 (1968) (A legitimate child has the right to bear 
the surname of both father and mother.). 
57 1n In re Green, 54 Misc. 2d 606,607,283 N.Y.S.2d 242,244 (Civ. Cit. 1967), the court 
stated, "The proudest patronymic in the land is available to the lowliest individual, and this 
without anyone's permission." Accord, In re Leibowitz, 49 F. Supp. 953 (N .D. Ill. 1943); 
Weingand v. Lorre. 231 Cal. App. 2d 289, 41 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1964); Horesta v. Horesta, I 18 
N.J. Super. 71, 286 A.2d 83 (1971); In re Evetts, 392 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). 
58See. e.g .. Worms v. Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1967); In re 
Yessner, 61 Misc. 2d 174,175,304 N.Y.S. 2d 901,901 (Civ. Ct. 1%9);ln re Keach, 51 Misc. 
2d 1097, 274 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Onondaga County Ct. 1966). 
59/11 re Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1968); Fulghum v. Paul, 229 Ga. 
463, 192 S.E.2d 376 (1972); Eschrich v. Williamson, 475 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
The court in In re Williams, 86 Misc. 2d 87, 89, 381 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (Civ. Ct. 1976), 
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2. Statutory Name Change Procedures-All states now have a 
statute setting forth methods for the change of name.60 The pur-
pose of these statutory procedures is to promote the state's interest 
in record keeping.61 Courts in most jurisdictions have recognized 
that these 
statutes do not abrogate the common law rule which allows a 
person to change his name without resort to legal procedure or 
repeal it by implication or otherwise. They merely affirm and 
are in aid of the common law rule and provide an additional 
method of effecting a name change .... 62 
Three states, however, have adopted or at one time followed a 
contrary position to the effect that the statute ''provides the only 
method by which one can change his name with legal effect. " 63 
A person who petitions for a statutory change of name has the 
burden of satisfying the court that the request should be granted. 
Courts differ as to the extent of the burden placed on the petitioner. 
Some courts have broad discretion in deciding the merits of a 
petition. 
A person's right to change his name by court order is not 
absolute ... [A]n application for a change of name may prop-
erly be denied where the change is sought for a fraudulent 
purpose, ... or where the change of name will result in the 
invasion of the rights of others .... And even in the absence of 
a showing of fraud or the invasion of rights of another, the court 
may be justified in denying an application for a change of 
name. 64 
cautioned that the question of what name a child is to bear "should not be treated· as if it 
were a matter of property rights or a question of title." See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259. 10-.11 
(West Supp. 1976), which requires a court to consider what is in the best interests of a child 
before granting a change of name for a minor. See generally Carlsson, Surnames of Married 
Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N.Y.L.F. 552, 568 (1971). See also notes 84-94 and 
accompanying text infra. 
• 0see note 5 supra. 
61 See, e.g., In re McGehee, 147 Cal. App. 2d 25,304 P.2d 167 (1956); In re Ross, 8 Cal. 2d 
608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); In re Useldinger, 35 Cal. App. 2d 723, 96 P.2d 958 (1939); In re 
Lawrence, 133 N .J. Super. 408, 337 A.2d 49 (1975). 
621n re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, __ , 216 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1975); accord, Winken-
hoffer v. Griffen, 511 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Ky. App. 1974); In re Natale, 527 S.W. 2d 402 (Mo. 
App. 1975). 
631n re Merolevitz, 320 Mass. 448, 450, 70 N.E.2d 249, 250 (1946). The earliest Mas-
sachusetts case, Lord v. Cummings, 303 Mass. 45'7, 22 N.E.2d 26 (1939), held that the 
statute was the only way to effect a legal change of name. In re Merolevitz, supra, 
reaffirmed that position. The court in Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956), 
citing Merolevitz, adopted the majority position that the statute is merely in aid of the 
common law. Since the Mark decision, Massachusetts appears to take a position in confor-
mity with the majority of states. In re Rusconi, 341 Mass. 167, 167 N.E.2d 847 (1960). See In 
re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 694 (Me. 1975), which is in accord with the earlier Massachusetts 
rule. PA. ST AT. ANN. tit. 54, § 5 (Purdon 1964), provides that the use of other means besides 
the statutory procedure for the change of name is illegal. See, e.g., In re Falucci, 355 Pa. 
588, 50 A.2d 200 (1947). 
64In re Evetts, 392 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). 
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Other courts have held that while generally 
some substantial reason must exist before the court is justified 
in refusing to grant the petition, it is also the general rule that 
the court is not subject to the whim or capricious desire of a 
petitioner to change his name ... [P]etitioner has the burden of 
establishing that it is just and reasonable that the petition be 
granted-not merely tht petitioner desires it and that the 
request is without fraud. 65 
163 
Finally, some courts have stated that because the purpose of the 
statute is to provide a record of the change of name and because 
the petitioner may otherwise resort t.o a common law change of 
name, a statutory change of name should be denied "only where 
there is a showing of 'substantial reason' . . . or 'peculiar cir-
cumstances' .... In effect the burden of proof rests on the person 
who would deny the change, not the person seeking the change. " 66 
In many respects a name involves more than the individual's 
freedom of expression. In a highly organized society, names are to 
some extent "established as a police institution in the interest of 
society in general, not of the individual .... " 67 Although the state 
could keep records more effectively by using numbers, names will 
undoubtedly play a vital role in the identification process for the 
foreseeable future. There can be no doubt that a change of name 
creates both the possibility of fraud, 68 as well as a bureaucratic 
burden for the state.69 Thus, it is not surprising that judges, as 
officials of the state, often exercise their discretion to deny name 
changes requested for insubstantial reasons. 
The state recognizes and provides for the desire for a change of 
name at certain times, such as naturalization, 70 adoption, 71 mar-
65/n re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, _, 216 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1975). 
66/n re Marriage of Banks, 42 Cal. App. 3d 63 I, 638, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37, 42 (1974); accord, 
Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975). 
67Comment, supra note 15, at 503. 
68See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 221-22 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd without 
opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972), where the court stated: 
As has been previously indicated, the state has a significant interest in maintaining 
close watch over its licensees. The confusion which would result if each driver 
were allowed to obtain licenses in any number of names is obvious. This would be 
true not only of the maintenance of driving records, but also of the identification 
purposes to which a license is put .... 
69See, e.g., In re Klimpl, 11 Conn. Supp. 460 (1943). 
708 U .S.C. § 1447(0 (1970). 
11 CoNN. GEN. STAT.§ 45-69 0960); D.C. CODE§ 16-312(c) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 
63.131 (1969); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 578-13 (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-3-1-8 (Burns 
Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 9:435 (West 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6 
(Michie/Law Co-op. 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 710.59 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. 
ANN.§ 259.28 (West 1971); Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 93-1·7-3 (Supp. 1976); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 
453.080 (1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 170-8:21 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 9:3-27, § 
9-3-31 (West 197~). 
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riage, 72 and divorce. 73 However, in other situations, judges have 
been. unwilling to allow statutory name changes. Ironically, while 
denying a person a statutory name change, which would fulfill the 
state interest in record keeping, many judges advise the petitioner 
of the availability of the common law method. 74 In other cases, 
judges have frustrated both the state's interest in stability of names 
and the personal right to determine one's own name by requiring a 
change of name where the person did not want one. 75 The most 
frequent example is the case of a woman who wants to retain her 
birth name after marriage. 76 
72CAL. Civ. PRoc. CooE § 1279.5(b) (West Supp. 1976) (;\ married woman may continue 
to use her former name if she uses it consistently.); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 574-1 to 2 (Supp. 
1975) (Upon marriage each party declares the surname that party will use, either that 
person's former name, the spouse's surname, or a hyphenated combination of the two.); 
IOWA CODE§ 674.12 {1975). 
73ALA. CooE tit. 34, § 39(1) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (A wife may be enjoined from using her 
husband's given name or initials.); ALASKA STAT.§ 09.55.210(7) (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 
25-325(0) (1962); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CooE § 4362 (West Supp. 1976) (A court will restore the 
former or birth name regardless of any child's name.); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-2-209 (Supp. 
1975) (Although there is no explicit provision for a change of name upon divorce, this statute 
asssumes its availability.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 46-60 (Supp. 1976); DEL. CooE ANN. 
tit. 13, § 1514 (Supp. 1976) (Upon request a change may be made to any former name that a 
party has had.); D.C. CooE § 16-915 (1973); GA. CooE ANN.§§ 30-116, 121 (1969); HAW. 
REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 17 (1974); IND. CooE ANN.§ 31-l-11.5-18 (Bums Supp. 1976); KAN. 
STAT.§ 60-1610(e) (1964); KY. REV. STAT.§ 403.230 (Supp. 1976); LA. CooE Civ. PRo. 
ANN. form no. 208(c) n.l (West 1963) (No need exists for the court to restore a woman's 
former name because a woman's legal name never varies with changes in her marital 
status.); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19, § 752 (1965); Mo. ANN. CooE art. 16, § 32 (Supp. 1976); 
MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 23 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1975); MICH. CoMP. LAWS 
ANN.§ 552.391 (Supp. 1976) (A divorced party may adopt any surname.); MINN. STAT ANN. 
§ 518.27 (West Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-328(4) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (If 
there are no children a divorced party may use any former name.); NEB. REv. STAT. § 
42-364 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (Name change is not specified among the orders a court may 
make.), see, NEB. REv. STAT.§ 60-415(2) (1974) (The provision seems to be premised on the 
fact that it is possible to make a change at divorce.); NEv. REv. STAT.§ 125.130(3) (l 975)(A 
divorced party may return to the use of any former name for just and reasonable cause.); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-21 (1952) (A court may order a wife not to use her husband's 
surname.); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW§ 240-a (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 50.12 
(1976); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.34 (Page 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 
(West Supp. 1976); OR. REv. STAT.§ 107.105(g) (1975) (It is mandatory for a court to restore 
the premarriage name if requested.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 98 (Purdon I 955); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS§ 15-5-17 (1970); s.c. CODE§ 20-117 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS§ 25-4-47 (1967)(A 
wife cannot return to the use of her maiden name under this provision if there is a child, but 
can get a name change under the regular name change statute. See Ogle v. Circuit 
Court, __ S.D. __ , 227 N.W.2d 621 (1975)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 557 (1958); VA. 
CODE§ 20-107 (1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 26.09.150 (Supp. 1976)(A court may order 
a wife not to use her husband's name.); W. VA. CooE § 48-2-21 (1966) (A wife may take her 
former name if there is no child in the present marriage, or she can take the name of any 
former husband if she had children by him.); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 247.20 (West Supp. 1976) 
(A wife may resume use of her former name if no child is in her custody and she is not 
receiving alimony.). 
74See, e.g., In re Brast, 32 Conn. Supp. I, 334 A.2d 483 (1974); In re Cohen, 4 Conn. 
Supp. 342 (1936); Solomon v. Solomon, 5 Ill. App. 2d 297, 125 N.E.2d 675 (1955); In re 
Green, 54 Misc. 2d 606,283 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (Civ. Ct. 1967); In re Johns, 29 Misc. 2d 81,212 
N.Y.S.2d (Queens County Ct. 1961). 
15See, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff d without opinion, 
405 U.S. 970 (1972); In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). 
76Recently, however, many courts have allowed a woman to-retain her maiden name upon 
marriage. These courts have rul_ed consistently with the common law, see note 30 supra, and 
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In many cases in which a judge has denied a statutory name 
change, the decision seems to be based upon the judge's personal 
biases or lack of sensitivity to the petitioner's personal interests. 
For example, some judges have denied the request of a married 
woman to return to the use of her maiden name 77 or the request of a 
divorced woman that her children's names be changed to her 
name78 out of concern that the children would be branded as 
illegitimate. Other judges have feared that to allow a married 
woman to use her birth name would be but "another step toward 
the destruction of the family, the basic unit of our society.'' 79 Some 
denials have been based on the judge's prejudices as to race and 
ethnicity. 80 Still other name changes have been denied because the 
judge felt that the change was unwarranted. 81 It is difficult to see 
what interest is served in these denials, since the judges have 
frustrated either state or personal interests or both while failing to 
promote any rational purpose. 
with the state's interest in consistency by allowing the woman to retain her birth name when 
she desires to do so. 
In point of fact, permitting a married woman to retain her own name, [sic] would 
eliminate substantial administrative problems incident to change of name. With the 
rapid increase of divorces and remarriages in America today, with attendant name 
changes, we may reach the point of having to forbid a change of name by marriage 
in order to bring about stability, reduce confusion and preserve the identity of 
women who acquire a different name from each successive husband. 
Dunn v. Palermo, __ Tenn. __ , __ , 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (1975). See Custer v. 
Bonadies, 30Conn. Supp. 385,318 A.2d 639 (1974); Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 
App. 1974); In re Hauptly, __ Ind. __ , 312 N.E. 2d 857 (1974); In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d 
402 (Mo. App. 1975). See also, Daum, The Right of Married Women to Assert Their Own 
Surnames, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF., 64, 65 n.5 (1974). 
77See In re Hauptly, __ Ind._·_, 312 N.E.2d 857,860 (1974), where the court reversed 
the trial judge's denial of a change of name. 
78Egnerv. Egner, 133 N.J. Super. 403,335 A.2d 46(1975); Cf. In re Toelkes, 97 Idaho 406, 
545 P.2d 1012 (1976) (illegitimate child). 
79Marshall v. State, 3bl So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. App. 1974) (concurring opinion). In re 
Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408,337 A.2d 49 (1975); cf. Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J. Super. 403, 
337 A.2d 46 (1975) (A divorced woman was denied the right to return to the use of her 
premarriage name.). 
80 Examples of such bias appear in the following extracts. "Petitioner should realize that 
he bears an honored name and should not hide his original identity by the assumption of 
another name totally and strangely different from the one he has borne since birth." In re 
Green, 54 Misc. 2d 606,607,283 N.Y.S.2d 242,245 (Civ. Ct. 1967). "The name he presently 
bears is one that bespeaks his American forebears and heritage and this court will not aid 
him in his avowed intention to foreswear his original identity by assuming another and 
totally different name under the facts and circumstances set forth." In re Johns, 29 Misc. 2d 
31, 32, 212 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147-48 (Queens County Ct. 1961). 
It is to be gathered from the testimony of the petitioner that it would be more 
advantageous for him to bear a name of apparent Irish origin than Jewish .... Each 
race has its virtues and faults and men consider these in their relations with one 
another. The applicant would be traveling under false color, so to speak, if his 
request were granted .... 
In re Cohen, 4 Conn. Supp. 342, 343 (1936). For similar cases, see In re Middleton, 60 Misc. 
2d 1056, 304 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Civ. Ct. 1969); In re Jama, 51 Misc. 2d 9,272 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Civ. 
Ct. 1966); contra, In re Halligan, 46 A.D.2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
81Turesky v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 2d 838, 218 P.2d 784 (1950); In re Greenfield, 66 
Misc. 2d 733,322 N.Y,S.2d 276 (Civ. Ct. 1970). 
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Judges also impose their personal biases when they require that a 
married woman who applies for a statutory change of name in 
order to use her maiden name must show that her husband has 
assented. 
[T]he court's request for the husband's assent to the wife's 
name change has become a standard feature of such proceed-
ings. It is submitted that no interest of the state can be identified 
in the procedural requirement that a husband assent to the 
wife's change of name. It is not a valid exercise of judicial 
discretion to require a woman to bear a name that she does not 
want, unless there is a demonstrable administrative reason 
therefor. At present, a woman's child may bear a surname 
different from his mother's after the mother has undergone a 
divorce and remarriage; and no detrimental administrative con-
sequences appear to result if the parties to a marriage choose to 
have different surnames .... A woman ought to be free to use 
her maiden name as a matter of right, subject only to her 
satisfying whatever procedural requirements are deemed 
necessary for administrative reasons. Enabling legislation is 
needed and should be enacted to this end. 82 
Since courts have held that there is no property interest in 
another's name and that a person has a right to determine his own 
name, 83 no legal basis exists for requiring the husband's assent to a 
married woman's request for a change of name. 
Following a divorce, a mother with custody frequently petitions 
the court for a change of her children's names, often to that of a 
new stepfather. The articulated standard for decision is "the best 
interests of the child. " 84 In applying this standard, judges typically 
consider factors such as the father's interest in having his children 
bear his name;85 the father's demonstrated continuing concern 'for 
his children's welfare evidenced by his making support payments, 
visits, and a prompt protest to any change of name; the possible 
effect of a change of name on the father's relationship with the 
children; the age of the children; and any misconduct by the 
father. 86 Although courts equate these factors with the best inter-
ests of the child, the courts have also stated that "the advantage to 
82Lund and Healy, Sex Discrimination, 1971 ANN. SURVEY OF MASS. L. 562, 571 (1971). 
In In re Hauptly,_ Ind._,_, 312 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1974), the state's brief asserted 
that the petitioner's desire to use her birth name was an insult to her husband. 
83See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. 
84See, e.g., Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 Del. Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436 (1963); In re Yessner, 
61 Misc. 2d 174, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 901 (Civ. Ct. 1969). 
85See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra. 
""Montandon v. Montandon, 242 Cal. App. 2d 886, 52 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1966); In re 
McGehee, 147 Colo. App. 2d 25,304 P. 2d 167 (1956); Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 Del. Ch. 
46, 187 A.2d 436 (1963); Tolbert v. Tolbert, 131 Ga. App. 388,206 S.E.2d 63 (1974); Plass v. 
Leithold, 381 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). 
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the child in having the name changed must be so 'substantial' as to 
outweigh the natural right of the father that his children bear his 
name. " 87 Courts rarely focus on the impact of a particular name of 
the child,88 as distinguished from the interests of other parties. 
The basis used for granting a petition for a change of a name in 
these cases to another has been arbitrary and inconsistent. A 
change of name has been allowed where the father was an adul-
terer, 89 failed to support his children for two years,90 committed 
manslaughter,91 raped his child,92 or where the child's initials were 
the same as those of his half-brother, grandfather, and father. 93 
However, in Worms v. Worms, 94 the petition was denied even 
though the father had never contributed regularly to his children's 
support, he had contributed nothing for eighteen· months, and the 
children had become involved in fights in school as a result of their 
unusual name. 
Inevitably, as the number of divorces rises, courts will be faced 
with the problem of name change more frequently. If courts intend 
to base their decisions on the child's best interests, more consistent 
standards should be articulated. Although the decisions are neither 
logical nor the result of a well-developed policy, by denying name 
changes except in the most egregious cases, the courts may have 
reached the best solution. In effect, judges have given childr~n a 
stable identity referent. However, if this is the court's purpose in 
denying these petitions, it has been reached through a subterfuge of 
conflicting "rights." 
Many people see their names as a means of expressing personal 
convictions and values. Muhammed Ali, Malcolm X, and Kareem 
Abdul-Jabbar, for example, assumed names to express religious 
and social identities. Many women have sought to use names 
which they see as a means of expressing their self-images as inde-
pendent people. 95 In the past, the common law afforded people the 
87Worms v. Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 135, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (1967). Mark v. Kahn, 
333 Mass. 517, 131 N .E. 2d 758 (1956); In re Thomas, 416 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. App. 1967); In re 
Keach, 51 Misc. 2d 1097, 274 N .Y.S.2d 938 (Onondaga County Ct. 1966); In re De Jesus, 44 
Misc. 2d 833, 254 N. Y .S.2d 23 (Civ. Ct. 1964). See also notes 56-58 and accompanying text 
supra. 
881n Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga. App. 280, 63 S.E.2d 345 (1951), the court allowed a change of 
name holding that it was in the best interests of the child to have the same name as.the rest of 
the family, especially because he had used that name from the time he was a year old. 
However, in West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297,283 A.2d 401 (1971), the court said that it was not 
unusual to have more than one name in a family. 
89/n re Adoption of Wildrick, 25 Misc. 2d 1078, 212 N.Y.S.2d 350 (St. Laurence County 
Ct. 1960). 
90/n re Adoption of McCory, 31 Ohio Misc. 195, 287 N.E.2d 833 (1972). 
91 /n re Yessner, 61 Misc. 2d 1974, 304 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Civ. Ct. 1969). 
92 Buckley v. State, 19 Ala. App. 508, 98 So. 362 (1923). 
93Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark. 377, 247 S.W.2d 1015 (1952). 
9 '252 Cal. App. 2d 130, 60 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1967). 
95See note 14 and accompanying text supra; In re Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408; 337 
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right to determine their own names. However, it is not clear that 
this same freedom will be extended to those seeking a statutory 
change of name for political, religious, or social reasons which a 
judge may not sympathize with or understand. In such a case, a 
judge may simply dismiss the petition as unwarranted. 
II. CODIFICATIONS OF NAME LAW 
Recently a number of states have revised their statutes dealing 
with names.96 In addition, one of the most ambitious recent at-
tempts to revise the law of names was undertaken in Quebec, 
Canada,97 through the promulgation of a proposed act. This pro-
posed act contains many positive, progressive provisions;98 how-
ever, it incorporates a great deal of the rigidity characteristic of the 
provisions in civil law countries as opposed to the flexibility of the 
common law treatment of the law of names. For example, the 
proposed act would provide that a legitimate or acknowledged 
illegitimate child must assume the father's surname.99 It would also 
make it quite difficult to change a person's name .100 Thus, the 
proposed act has the disadvantge of not incorporating the flexibil-
ity of the common law, though it does have the advantage of clarity 
and consistency for the individual and for the state. 
Hawaii has revised its code in a way which limits the options 
previously available under the common law .101 Although the 
Hawaiian legislature may have intended to maximize a couple's 
options, and though it has instituted an excellent system for the 
state to ascertain what name each of the spouses will use after 
marriage, it limits the number of choices a couple has to three. 
Since Hawaii has one of the less generous change of name sta-
tutes, 102 this statutory scheme imposes a genuine limitation upon 
A.2d 49 (1975); In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (1975). Custer v. 
Bonadies, 30 Conn. Supp. 385, _, 318 A.2d 639, 641 (1974), the court acknowledged this 
trend. 
We live in the age of the women's rights movement, when federal law prohibits 
discrimination in employment on account of sex, when the equal rights amendment 
has passed the Congress ... when women march in the streets to demand equal 
status before the law, and when some women go to court for the right to vote in 
their "own" names. 
96See notes 4, 68-70 supra. A significant number of states have revised their statutes in the 
last two years. See also Hughes, And Then There Were Two, 23 HASTINGS L. REV. 233, 
239-43 (1971), for a discussion of some other recent proposed statutes. 
97OFFICE DE REVISION DU CODE CIVIL, RAPPORT SUR LE NOM ET L' lDENTITE PHYSIQUE 
DE LA PERSONNE HUMAINE (1975) [hereinafter cited as QUEBEC AcT]. 
98For example, the proposed act promotes equality of the sexes and stability of names by 
providing that both spouses retain their given names and surnames after marriage. QUEBEC 
AcT, supra note 97, art 10. 
99QuEBEC AcT, supra note 97, arts. 2-4. 
100QuEBEC ACT, supra note 97, arts. 11-15. 
101 HAw. REv. STAT.§§ 574-1 to 2 (Supp. 1975). 
102HAW. REV. STAT. § 574-5 (1969). 
FALL 1976] Proposal for a Model Name Act 169 
the freedom of self-expression. In 1976, a bill was introduced in the 
Ohio legislature which is similar to the Hawaii statute with respect 
to the change of name on marriage. 103 Unfortunately, Hawaii and 
Ohio have unnecessarily sacrificed the flexibility and freedom of 
the common law in an otherwise laudable effort at codification. 104 
III. A PROPOSED MODEL NAME ACT 
The law of names deals with such problems as what constitutes a 
name, how one may choose one's own or one's child's name, 
under what name or names a person may contract, what are man-
datory or permissive name changes, and what the legal effect is 
where a name is in doubt. The law of names should accommodate 
the potential conflict between the personal interest in self-
expression105 and the state's administrative needs. 106 The need for 
a consistent codification of the law of names is apparent. 
Until recently, the common law as a whole has developed ap-
propriate solutions to legal problems involving names, despite 
problems in interpretation. 107 However, a number of factors de-
mand that the law evolve more quickly. Many people, for instance, 
use their names as a means of expressing themselves. Women are 
showing an increased interest in retaining their birth names after 
marriage. 108 Parents may give their children unusual names or ones 
which do not follow the _pattern of using the father's surname. 109 
103 H.B. 1577, 111th Ohio General Assembly (1975-1976). 
io•As one of the foremost commentators on name law has stated, "[I]n all areas of name 
change legislation is not preferable." Letter from Priscilla Ruth McDou~al to author (Nov. 
15, 1976). This seems, however, to be based on a view that state legislatures will inevitably 
be insensitive to the flexibility inherent in the common law. However, it is clearly not certain 
that the judiciary, even with the aid of briefs prepared by able counsel, will produce more 
favorable results. See, e.g., Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
45 U.S.L.W. 3432 (Dec. 12, 1976). 
10•For example, name law must accommodate people who wish to change their names, 
without regard to their reasons. Bentham, supra note 50, at 616, states: "[l]t is perhaps 
characteristic of the sound sense and elasticity of our English law that ... it should make no 
attempt in general to limit a man's right to change his name by the assumption of any na/Jle 
he pleases, either in substitution for, or in addition to his original name." 
106Those aspects of the law of names which may best accommodate personal interests in 
self-expression may present the greatest conflict with state interests in stability. "I shudder 
to think of the governmental and business records that must be revised, and the confusion 
that will ultimately result merely to accommodate the appellant's most unorthodox cap-
rice." In re Hauptly, __ Ind. __ , __ , 312 N.E.2d 857, 862 (1974) (Prentice, J., 
dissenting upon the allowance of a married woman's petition to retain her maiden name). 
See In re Klimpl, 11 Conn. Supp. 460 (1943). 
107Amold, supra note 10, at 227. 
108See, e.g., CENTER FORA WoMAN'sOwN NAME, BOOKLET FOR WOMEN WHO W1sH TO 
DETERMINE THEIR OWN NAMES AFTER MARRIAGE (1974); U. STANNARD, supra note 14. 
109See, e.g .. Abby and Anita Hoffman's child "America," Grace Slick's child "China" 
(n.ee "God"), and Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden's child who bears the surname "Garrity." 
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Moreover, the rising number of divorces will likely lead to an 
increased number of name changes. 
The growth in population coupled with an increase in record 
keeping has accentuated the state's interest in consistency in all 
aspects of names. 11° Courts and counsel have often failed to take 
the time to do adequate research 111 or to realize fully the context of 
their decisions.11 2 Many judges have been influenced by personal 
bias113 or custom and, as a result, have failed to write opinions 
which promote personal and state interests. 
A codification of name law offers a basis for future change in a 
conscious framework that accommodates the competing interests 
of consistency for record keeping purposes and self-expression. By 
articulating clear guidelines for a change of name, a model name 
act can avoid problems associated with prior laws and often avoid 
the need for expensive and burdensome litigation. A statutory 
name change procedure which supersedes the common law is 
preferable because it fulfills the state's need for record keeping and 
provides a determination in advance as to the presence or absence 
of a purpose to deceive.11 4 In short, a model name act can preserve 
those features of the common law consistent with the articulated 
values providing a tested basis for the Act, while eliminating those 
aspects which are inconsistent. For these reasons the following act 
is proposed. 
MODEL NAME ACT 
Section I 
This act shall be known as the Model Name Act. 
" 0States have become increasingly insistent on adequate identification when registering 
for activities such as voting or driving in one's "legal" name. 
111Many decisions have relied on no more than annotations in· legal encyclopedias. See 
note 112 infra. 
112One of the clearest recent examples has been the judiciary's failure to separate social 
customs from the law with regard to a married woman's name. 
Three factors probably account for this failure. The first is the almost universal 
impact of the practice. Very few married women do use surnames other than their 
husband's, and from this observable fact it could be inferred, albeit perhaps 
improperly, that the law requires women who marry to adopt their husband's 
surnames. Second, one must consider the nature of most of the decisions which 
have found such a requirement. Few of them turned on the legal question of the 
proper surname for a married woman, and hence the courts may not have seen a 
need to do extensive reserch on the subject. The third factor is inertia. Once 
several decisions, containing dicta to the effect that a married woman's surname is 
her husband's, had been reported and gathered together in legal encyclopedias and 
annotations, courts may have considered the question settled. 
Note, The Right of a Married Woman to Use Her Birth-Given Name for Voter Registration, 
32 Mo. L. REv. 409, 421, 422 n.70 (1973). 
" 3See Aspenberger v. Lincoln Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 282 Ill. App. 52 (1935). See also note 77 
supra. 
114/n re Reben, 342 A.2d 688, 694 (Me. 1975). This does not imply an extension of the 
principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata to the determination of the existence of an 
intent to deceive to parties not involved in this procedure: 
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Section 2 
(a) This act shall be liberally construed to promote its underly-
ing purposes and policies. 
(b) The purposes and policies of this act are: 
(1) to make consistent and uniform the law within the vari-
ous jurisdictions; 
(2) to clarify and modernize the law governing names and 
name changes; 
(3) to codify the common law where appropriate and to 
replace the common law where it is inconsistent with 
the purposes and policies of this act; and 
(4) to provide for an accommodation of the state interest in 
record keeping and the personal interest in freedom of 
self-expression. 
(c) Unless displaced by this act, the state statutory provisions 
and the principles of the common law and equity shall 
remain in force and supplement its provisions. 
Section 3 
This act shall apply only to personal names of natural persons. 
Section 4 
(a) A legal surname of a natural person shall consist of [one/ 
two] given name[s]; only the [first/first two] shall constitute 
the legal name. An initial, whether a vowel or a consonant, 
may be a given name or a surname. 
(b) A legal signature shall consist of a person's full surname 
plus [one/two] given name[s] represented either by the full 
name, the initial letter, or other commonly accepted ab-
breviation of the name. 
171 
At common law, only a given name and a surname were recog-
nized.115 The middle name was regarded as surplusage.11 6 With the 
growth in population and general mobility, it seems consistent with 
the state record keeping needs to require at least two given names. 
However, to require two given names is a matter for a particular 
state legislature to decide. Although the common law at first ac-
cepted only vowels as names in the case of initials, gradually courts 
held that any initial, vowel, or consonant, could be used as a 
name. 11 7 The act provides that initials may be used either as a legal 
name given at birth, or a person may choose to represent any given 
115State v. Webster, 30 Ark. 166 (1875); Gardner v. State, 4 Ind. 632 (1835); Loser v. 
Plainfield Sav. Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 128 N.W. I JOI (1910); Kay v. Kay, 51 Ohio Op. 434, 112 
N.E.2d 562 (1953). 
116Schofield v. Jennings, 68 Ind. 232 (1879); Choen v. State, 52 lnd. 347 (1876); Riley v. 
Litchfield, 168 Iowa 187, 150 N.W. 81 (1914); Collins v. Boa{d of Supervisors, 158 Iowa 322, 
138 N.W. 1095 (1912); contra, Parker v. Parker, 146 Mass. 320, 15 N.E: 902 (1888). 
'
17People v. Reilly, 257 IJI. 538, JOI N.E. 54 (1913); I,,ucas v. Farrington, 21 IJI. 31 (1858): 
Porter v. Butterfield, 116 Iowa 725, 89 N.W. 199 (1902). 
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name by its initial letters. In any legal signature, however, a given 
name must be used either in full or by the initial letter. The act does 
not require that a surname be the last name for those people who 
traditionally place the surname first. 
(c) Every person shall exercise all legal rights and obligations 
using the legal name registered at birth or registered under a 
statutory name change pursuant to section 7 or section 10 of 
this act. Rights and obligations entered into under a name 
other than the legal name shall be enforced where appropri-
ate to prevent fraud or injustice. 
The above section is a codification of the common law with a 
change in emphasis. Under the common law, a person could use 
any name by which others identified him so long as the purpose 
was not to defraud.U 8 In part, as a result of a large, mobile 
population, the law has recently come to emphasize the need for 
the consistent use of one legal name. 119 This later development 
serves the state's record keeping function and also tends to protect 
people who need to know the identity of those with whom they 
deal. It is important, however, that this rule not be followed too 
rigidly, or it will operate inequitably. The law can best protect 
people's expectations by enforcing those legal obligations entered 
into by a name other than a person's legal name so long as the 
signatory's identity is certain. 12° Courts should protect these inter-
ests using basic contract doctrines such as estoppel, rather than by 
using some concept of the law of names. 
(d) Honorifics such as (but not limited to) Mr., Mrs., Dr., Miss, 
Ms., Prof., and Esq. are not part of a person's legal name. 
Suffixes such as (but not limited to) Jr. or Sr. are also not 
part of a person's legal name. 
At common law, honorifics generally were not considered to be 
part of a name because they do not convey the sort of useful 
information that a name does. 121 There does not seem to be any 
118Kreuter v. United States, 201 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1952); United States v. McKay, 2 
F.2d 257 (D. Nev. 1924); Linton v. First Nat'! Bank, IO F. 894 (W.D. Pa. 1882); Milbra v. 
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 182 Ala. 622, 62 So. 176 (1913); California Packing Corp. v. 
Kandarian, 62 Cal. App. 729,217 P. 805 (1923); White v. Hartman, 26 Colo. App. 475, 145 P. 
716 (1915); Loser v. Plainfield Sav. Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 128 N .W. 1101 (1910); Smith v. 
Williams, 152 La. 948, 94 So. 859 (1922); Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consol., 104 
Mont. 328, 67 P.2d 811 (1937). 
119Peak v. State, 240 Ind. 334, 163 N.E. 2d 584 (1960); In re Reben, 342 A.2d 688,694 (Me. 
1975); Venetsky v. West Essex Bldg. Supply Co., 28 N.J. Super. 178, 100 A.2d 291 (1953). 
Louisiana has always placed emphasis on this point. See, e.g., De Renzes v. His Wife, 115 
La. 675, 39 So. 805 (1905). 
120See Sanders v. Sitton, 179 Kan. 118, 292 P.2d 1099 (1956); Latham Mercantile & 
Commercial Co. v. Harrod, 71 Kan. 565, 81 P. 214 (1905); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Lane, 246 Md. 
55, 227 A.2d 231 (Md. App. 1967). 
121See, e.g., Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 1975); Harrell v. Alabama 
Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins._ Co., 287.Ala. 259,251 So. 2d 220 (1971); Carlton v. Phelan, 100 
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reason to change the common law, especially in light of the grow-
ing informality in such usage today. Suffixes, on the other hand, do 
perform a useful function by distinguishing between people bearing 
the same name. 122 However, they are subject to change. Thus, 
they are not an appropriate part of a legal name. They may, of 
course, be used as part of a name other than as a suffix. 
Section 5 
(a) Parents may give their child any surname they agree on, 
either at birth or pursuant to an antenuptuial agreement, 
whether or not it is borne by either parent, so long as the 
name does not defraud or operate to create injustice. If the 
parents are unable to agree upon a surname, a daughter 
takes the surname of her mother, and a son takes the sur-
name of his father. 
At common law, a person could bear any name so long as the 
purpose was not to defraud. 123 Courts have held that the practice 
of a child's taking his father's surname is a matter of custom. 124 
Other courts have stated that parents do not have a property right 
in a minor's name. 125 With widespread support for equal rights for 
women, it is appropriate to give both parents the same rights in 
naming children. 126 If most people continue to assume one family 
name at marriage by following the procedure provided in section 7 
of this act, then a daughter would assume the surname common to 
both parents in a case where parents could not agree. 
This section provides for greater freedom of choice yet still 
accommodates current custom. If each spouse prefers to retain his 
birth name, the statute provides an equitable way to choose a 
surname for the child in the event of a dispute. The act assumes 
Fla. 1164, 131 So. 117 (1930); Weathers v. Modern Masonry Materials, Inc., 107 Ga. App. 
34, 129 S.E.2d 65 (1%2); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. A'.ss'n.v. Rtserve Life Ins. 
Co., 90 Ga. App. 332, 83 S.E.2d 66 (1954); City of Camilla v. May; 70 Ga. App. 136, 27 
S.E.2d 777 (1943); Feld v. Loftis, 240 Ill. 105, 88 N.E. 281 (1909); Wherry v. B.ackelman, 126 
Ind. App. 136, 130 N.E.2d 777 (1955); State ex rel. Rainey v. Crowe, 382 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 
App. 1964); contra, Allyn v. Allison, 34 Cal. App. 3d 448, I JO Cal. Rptr. 77 (1973); Huff v. 
State Election Bd., 168 Okla. 277, 32 P.2d 920 (1920). 
122But see Dunaway v. Lindsley-Feiber Motor Co., 73 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1954); 
Commonwealth ·v. Parmenter, IOI Mass. 211 (1869). 
'
23See note 43 and accompanying text supra. 
124Manz v. Philadelphia Brewing Co., 37 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Laks v. Laks, 25 
Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (I 975); See Kay v. Kay, 5 I Ohio Op. 434, 436, 112 N .E.2d 562, 
565 (1953). 
125 Fulghum v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463,463, 192 S.E.2d 376,377 (1972); contra, L.A.M. v. State, 
547 P.2d 827, 832 n.13 (Alaska 1976), where the court said that parents have the right to have 
the child bear the parent's name; Dolgin v. Dolgin, I Ohio App. 2d 430, 205 N.E.2d 106 
(1965). 
126See Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P.2d 1277 (i975); De Renzes v. His Wife, 115 
La. 675, 39 So. 805 (1905). Evidently in Turkey, it was formerly the custom for the father to 
choose the-name of the first born and for the mother to select the name for the second child. 
Scatzel, supra note 3, at 190. 
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that this is an area in which the state generally does not have any 
interest in intervention. If parents prefer, they can decide in a 
written antenuptial agreement on a means for choosing names for 
their children .. 
(b) Parents may give a child any given names on which 
they agree as long as the names do not defraud or 
otherwise operate to create injustice. If the parents 
are unable to agree, then each parent will give the 
child one name. 
This section provides for the choice of a child's given names. 
Section 4(a) sets forth the requirements for a legal name. The 
agency responsible for registering births may rely upon the infor-
mation given by one parent as to the names to which the parents 
have agreed, but it must ascertain that the name chosen meets legal 
requirements. It is suggested that the state agency which registers 
births send a copy of the birth certificate to the parents within a 
certain period of time -after the birth to provide for corrections. 
After a reasonable period, as defined by the state, the name would 
be recognized as the legal name. 
(c) A minor may not apply for a change of name either in his 
own person or by a next friend until he has attained the age 
of fourteen years, except in unusual circumstances. Mere 
divorce or subsequent remarriage of one or both parents 
shall not be considered sufficient reason to change a child's 
name. 
One of the most frequent causes for an application for a change 
of name is the divorce or remarriage of a parent who then desires a 
uniform household name. Courts have generally denied the 
change. 127 Except in unusual circumstances, it seems best to deny 
the possibility of a change of name to eliminate a possible source of 
conflict. The standard to be applied is whether the change of name 
is in the child's best interest allowing the court to exercise great 
discretion. Factors such as parental neglect or misbehavior should 
not be weighed heavily. Of greater importance should be the 
child's sense of identity. For example, where the name desired has 
been used since infancy there would be a reasonable ground for 
granting a change of name. There should be a presumption against 
any change of name until the minor is fourteen years old and can 
apply under section 10 using the same procedure as an adult. 128 
121See notes 80-89 and accompanying text supra. 
128Courts have tended to use the age of fourteen as the point at which a minor can exercise 
his discretion. See, e.g., Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58,540 P.2d 1277 (1975), in which the 
court stated that the opinion of children aged thirteen and fourteen should be ascertained; 
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(d) For the purposes of this act, a parent is generally defined as 
one who begets a child. However, parent may include any-
one who stands in a position equivalent to that of a par-
ent.' 29 
Section 6 
(a) A change in surname does not result from a change of given 
names; nor does a change in given names result from a 
change in surnames. 
(b) In cases of adoption, the surnames or given names or both 
surname and given names may be changed. There is no 
requirement or presumption of a change if no change pur-
suant to this act is made during the adoption proceedings. 
Adoption is a permissible ground for a change of a minor's 
name. 
175 
This section promotes the philosophy of the act in establishing a 
presumption against change of name, unless the ·petitioner or his 
representative takes affirmative action for a change. 
Section 7 
An individual retains his surname and given names throughout 
life, unless affirmative action is taken to register a new name at 
the time he applies for a marriage license or pursuant to the 
procedure established in section 10 of this act. Marriage by 
itself does not effect a change of name. 
Some courts have recognized that it is not necessary for all 
members of a family to bear the same name. 130 Recently, most 
courts addressing the question of whether a married couple must 
use the same name have decided that they nee~ not do so. 131 This 
Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. App. 1962) (twelve years too young to m*e a choice); 
Tolbert v. Tolbert, 131 Ga. App. 388, 394, 206 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1974) (Clark, J., dissenting); 
Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. App. 214, 351 A.2d 917 (1976); In re Lone, 134 N.J. Super. 213,338 
A.2d 883 (1975); Bruguier v. Bruguier, 12 N.J. Super. 350, 79 A.2d 497 (1951). Most statutes 
currently require a minor to petition for a change of name through his guardian or next 
friend. A few statutes do allow children younger than fourteen to request a change of name 
or will require that a minor younger than eighteen, but above a certain age, must join in any 
petition to change his name. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT.§ 12-601(8) (1956) (minor may file 
himself if over sixteen); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. IO, § 5902 (1975) (minor over fourteen must 
join in a petition); low A CoDE § 674.6 (1974) (minor over fourteen must file consent); M1cH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 71 I. I to 2 (Supp. 1976) (minor over sixteen must also sign petition). 
In other contexts, the United States Supreme Court has considered the age at which 
minors may exercise various rights and responsibilities. In Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. 
Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held that minors thirteen to sixteen 
years old would be protected in the exercise of their first amendment rights. Justice Douglas, 
dissenting in part, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972), relied on Tinker in 
asserting that the opinions of the Amish children in. their early teens should be ascertained 
before the Court ruled in Yoder. 
129Miller v. United States, 123 F.2d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1941). 
130Degerberg v. McCormick, 41 Del. Ch. 46, 52, 187 A.2d 436, 440 (1963). 
131 Walker v. Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395, 1402 (E.D. Ark. 1975); Custer v. Bonadies, 30 
Conn. Supp. 385,318 A.2d 639 (1974); Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226,229 (Fla. App.'f976); 
Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477, 477-78 (Fla. App. 1974); Stuart v. Board of Elections, 226 
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section is consistent with the general thrust of the common law 
which allows a person to determine his own name. However, the 
act adds a registration requirement where a legal change of name is 
desired. It is suggested that the states inquire on the marriage 
license application as to what legal name each person will use after 
marriage if it is to be different from the person's current legal 
name. 132 This procedure provides an alternative method for a 
change of name to that provided in section 10. 
Section 7 maximizes freedom of expression for a married couple. 
Moreover," it is more consistent with the state interest in record 
keeping than the present system. The couple could decide to bear 
one surname - either that of the wife, the husband, or a surname 
reached in mutual agreement. The only qualification is that the 
name recorded not operate to defraud or create injustice. Each 
spouse could also retain his birth name as his legal name and use 
one surname socially. Social use would not operate as a common 
law name change, because the common law method of change of 
name is abolished under section 9 of the act. It would still be 
possible to enter into legal obligations under such a name as pro-
vided by section 4(a), by applying basic contract principles. 
A third alternative for the couple would be for each spouse to 
retain his antenuptial name both legally and socially. In the ab-
sence of an affirmative change, a person's legal name is presumed 
to be the legal name used before marriage. 
Section 8 
A change of name is any modification of the legal name of a 
natural person. 
Section 9 
A change of name can only be made at marriage as provided by 
section 7 or through the change of name procedure in section 
10. The common law procedure for a change of name is hereby 
abolished. 
Most states allow common law name changes, even though they 
have enacted statutory· procedures. 133 The statutory method is 
Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972); Kotecki v. Augusztiny, 'i57 Nev. 393, 487 P.2d 925 (1975); 
State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 117 N.E.2d 616 (1961); Dunn v. Palermo, 
_Tenn.-, 522 S. W.2d 679 (1975). Louisiana, as long ago as 193 I, held that a woman's 
legal name is always her birth name. In re Kneipp, 172 La. 411, 134 So. 376 (1931); see, 
Witty v. Jefferson Parish Democratic Executive Comm., 245 La. 145, 171, 157 So. 2d 718, 
727 (1963) (Sanders, J., concurring); LA. CODE C1v. PRo. ANN. form no. 208c n.1. (West 
1963). Many other countries have agreed that women retain their birth surnames regardless 
of changes in their marital status. W. Schatzel states that in France women can use their 
maiden na111es during marriage, as can women in Spain. Arone time in Russia, a woman 
could use either her husband's surname or retain her birth name, or the husband could take 
the wife's surname. Schatzel, supra note 3, at 195. 
132See HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 574-1 to 2 (Supp. 1975). 
133See notes 62, 66, 74 and accompanying text supra. 
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preferable considering the broad scope of the common law134 with 
its failure to create a record of the date and extent of the change. 
Most states currently give no effect to common law name changes 
other than those of a woman upon marriage, for purposes such as 
registering to vote, obtaining a driver's license, or registering a 
motor vehicle. As a result, common law name changes are of 
limited utility. However, under section 4(a) a person remains le-
gally obligated under a name other than his legal name through 
incorporation of basic contract and estoppel principles. 
Section 10 
(a) A change of name shall be granted for any sufficient reason 
as long as the purpose of the change is not to defraud. 
(b) A change of name shall not be denied: 
(I) when the surname or given names of the petitioner are 
difficult to pronounce or spell; 
(2) when the surname or given names consistently used by 
the petitioner are not those registered at birth; 
(3) when the surname or the given names of the petitioner 
could subject him to ridicule or have become infamous; 
or 
(4) when there is a change of sexual identity following a 
surgical procedure. 
(c) In determining whether to grant a change of name, these 
enumerated grounds shall be construed liberally. 
It is in the state's interest to make the name change procedure 
simple and easily accessible. 135 The only major concern should be 
with the possibility of fraud. 136 Although it is clear that a change of 
name should be granted in cases where the legal name is unsuitable 
as a result of its length or inconvenience 137 or where it denominates 
the wrong sex, 138 courts should also accommodate other grounds 
for change of name. 
(d) A change of name shall be made by applying to [an agency 
. created by the state for processing petitions for name 
134 Under the common Jaw, one could make a change of name as long as there was no 
intent to defraud. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. 
' 35See Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309,114 A.2d 203 (1955);In re Hauptly,_ Ind.-, 312 
N.E.2d 857 (1974); In re B., 81 Misc. 2d 284, 366 N.Y.S.2d 98 (Wayne County Ct. 1975); 
Ogle v. Circuit Court,_ S.D. _, _, 227 N.W.2d 621, 625 (S.D. 1975). 
136See Weingand v. Lorre, 231 Cal. App. 2d 289, 41 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1964) (petitioner 
wanted to change his name to Peter Lorie, Jr.); In re Thompson, 82 Misc. 2d 460, 369 
N.Y.S.2d 278 (Civ. Ct. 1975). 
' 31See In re Knight, _Colo.App. _, 537 P.2d 1085 (1975); In re M., 91 N.J. Super. 
296, 219 A.2d 906 (1966). 
138See In re Anonymous, 64 Misc. 2d 309, 314 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Civ. Ct. 1970); See also 
David. The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 U. 
CONN. L. REv. 288, 299-300 (1975). 
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changes]. The petition shall set forth the applicant's present 
name, address, place of birth, any previous name changes, 
period of residency in the state, any real property owned in 
the state, any licenses held by the applicant, reasons for 
desiring a change of name, marital status, and the names of 
any creditors, any dependents, and parent or guardian (if 
the applicant is under fourteen) within the state. The peti-
tion must be acknowledged. The agency shall send notice 
by registered mail of the change of name petition to all 
creditors and dependents who do not reside with the appli-
cant. In addition, notice shall be published once a week for 
three consecutive weeks in a paper of general circulation in 
the community where the petitioner resides. The applicant 
shall pay a registration fee [to the processing agency] as 
well as all costs of notification at the time the petition is 
filed. 
If no one objects to the petition within six weeks after the 
notices are mailed and the agency determines that the peti-
tion is in order, the change shall be approved, and all 
relevant state records shall be changed to reflect the new 
name. Notice shall be sent to the state of birth and to any 
other state where there has been a statutory change of 
name. If there is an objection, a hearing ~hall be held before 
[the court which formally decides petitions for change of 
name]. 
Section lO(d) assures that a change of name will also result in a 
change of the relevant legal records. 
Section 11 
(a) Any natural person who is a citizen of the United States and 
who has been a resident of this state for [a time period] 
immediately preceding the petition may apply for a change 
of name. 
(b) A minor fourteen years or older may apply for a change of 
name in his own person, and the court shall consider the 
petition as it would that of an adult. 
Section 12 
A change of one person's name does not alter any other per-
son's name, unless that other person joins in: a request for a 
change of name. Subject to the restrictions in section 5(c) a 
parent may request a change of name for a minor younger than 
fourteen years of age. If the other parent objects to such a 
change, it shall not be granted. However, if the objecting parent 
has made the name notorious or the object of ridicule, or if for 
other similar reasons the court finds that a change would be in 
the best interest of the child, the petition may be granted. 
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Section I 2 is consistent with the presumption of this act against a 
change of name unless the person takes affirmative action. 139 It has 
generally been held that in the case of a minor both parents must 
join in a request for a change of name or at least that the non-
petitioning parent has not objected. 14° Courts, however, have been 
willing to allow a change of a child's name over the objections of a 
parent when that parent has caused the name to become an object 
of shame. 141 This ground for a change of name is consistent with 
section 10(b)(3) of the act. 
Section 13 
No person may object to another's use of a name except on the 
grounds that it does not meet with the requirements set forth in 
section 10. 
Section 13 is consistent with the common law principle that no 
one has a property right in a name so as to prevent another from 
using it, 142 absent fraud or intent to deceive. 143 Because under 
section 12 a change of name does not affect any other person's 
name, relatives would have no special grounds for objection. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The promulgation and adoption of a model name act ac-
complishes a number of desirable goals. It satisfies both the per-
sonal interest in self-expression and the state interest in record 
keeping. It maximizes and preserves the flexibility available under 
the common law. In addition, the proposed act makes it easier to 
determine a person's legal name, thus eliminating some possibilites 
for fraud. States should adopt such an act to effectuate the goals 
developed in this note. 
-Ellen Jean Dannin 
139See Sousa v. Freitas, 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970). 
140See, e.g., Garnierv. Racivitch, 216 La. 241, 43 So. 2d 595 (1949); Robinson v. Hansel, 
_ Minn. _, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974). 
141See, e.g., Buckley v. State, 19 Ala. App. 508, 98 So. 362 (1923) (father committed 
incest); In re W. H., 103 N.J. Super. 24, 246 A.2d 501 (1968) (father molested an eleven year 
old girl and impregnated his eldest child); In re Williams, 86 Misc. 2d 87,381 N.Y.S.2d 994 
(Civ. Ct. 1976) (child attending Catholic school embarrassed over divorce); In re Yessner, 61 
Misc. 2d 174, 304 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (father murdered child's grandfather). 
142See note 56 and accompanying text supra; Horesta v. Horesta, 118 N.J. Super. 71, 286 
A.2d 83 (1971). 
143See note 57 and accompanying text supra; Weingand v. Lorre, 231 Cal. App. 2d 289, 41 
<:al. Rptr. n8 (1964). 
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